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We  discuss  how  social  considerations  can  affect  the  desirability  of  trade  liberalization  in  a
conventional small open economy model. We consider a representative family in which there are
location specific network effects from interactions with other family members, such as joint
consumption, joint emotional support, and coinsurance. The benefits an individual receives  from
the network they participate in are nonlinearly related to the number of family members located in
urban and rural areas. Family members choose whether to locate in urban or rural areas and average
and marginal network benefits differ. With differential network effects in urban and rural areas, in
a model with traded urban and rural goods, free trade will no longer be the best policy. We show this
through a numerical example, and suggest that the conventional economists case for free trade may
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Economists base their advocacy of free trade in small open economy models on sim-
ple analytical structures in which Ricardian gains from comparative advantage are fully
exploited under complete openness. While the literature provides many counter exam-
ples in the presence of such features as market structure, rent shifting, infant industries
and others, little or no analytical work has explored how social considerations can in-
ﬂuence the case for free trade. This is despite an extensive sociological literature, and
anti-globalization protests based on social concerns.
Here we consider a simple formulation in which one set of social considerations is
considered which inﬂuence the desirability of free trade in such models. We consider a
two good world with separate urban and rural products both of which are traded, and
with labor as the intersectorally mobile input. We consider migration decisions between
sectors as determined not only by wage rate diﬀerences between sectors, but also by the
value to individuals of their participation in location speciﬁc (urban-rural) networks.
We have in mind a family structure in which there is value to individuals from their
interactions with other family members in the locality (urban or rural) through joint
consumption with other family members in the location, emotional support from family
members, coinsurance, and other beneﬁts.
While these beneﬁts are hard to quantify, and in reality are considerably more com-
plex than in our simple treatment, we show here how an analytical representation of
2their role can modify the conventional case for free trade. We consider a representative
family in which there are separate urban and rural network beneﬁts available to indi-
vidual family members which depend on the number of family members who choose to
reside in each location. The individual beneﬁts from these two separate networks are
nonlinearly related to the number of family members who locate in urban and rural
areas, and average and marginal network beneﬁts diﬀer. We show through numerical
simulation that with diﬀerential network eﬀects from location in urban and rural areas,
free trade will no longer be the best policy. The implication is that the conventional
economists case for free trade may need to be more nuanced once social considerations
are taken in to account.
Speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst numerically solve a simple two good trade model in the absence of
network beneﬁts for an equilibrium using assumed parameter values with and without
a tariﬀ on the good produced in the urban sector (assumed imported). In this case,
wages are equalized between the two sectors through migration of labor, and without
network eﬀects removal of the tariﬀ is welfare improving. This is as in conventional
trade analysis.
Using the same model parameterization, we then introduce network beneﬁts and
choose parameter values for the model such that the intensity of the network eﬀect is
set higher in the rural sector through parameter selection. The presence of diﬀerential
network eﬀects causes the wage rates in the urban and rural sectors to diﬀer, and in the
3case we analyze, removal of the tariﬀ on the urban good is welfare worsening. However,
this is not a general result since the model implies that there will be an optimal tariﬀ
rate given any parameterization of network eﬀects, and if the comparison is between an
actual tariﬀ rate and free trade and involves a tariﬀ rate larger than the optimal tariﬀ
rate, then free trade may still dominate in any particular pair wise comparison. Optimal
policy will only be free trade where network eﬀects are symmetric across urban and rural
areas. We also assume that other instruments, such as a tax on migrating labour, are
not available.
The main point of the paper, therefore, is to argue that in the presence of diﬀerential
network eﬀects in urban and rural areas trade liberalization can be welfare worsening.
The literature on consumption insurance in rural areas in low income countries provides
some evidence for the existence of community ties in rural areas (see Townsend (1995),
Fafchamp and Lund (2000)), and seemingly supports our analysis.
2 A Two Good Model with Network Eﬀects
We consider a small open economy populated with N identical individuals, and with
two sectors with separate products and regional identities and a deﬁned social network
operating in each. We assume rural (1) and urban (2) sectors, produce an agricultural
good (1) and a manufactured good (2) respectively using labor (n) and a ﬁxed factor in
4each sector. Each individual, for simplicity, owns one unit of labor. World prices for the
two goods, pw1 and pw2, are taken as given.
In the presence of a tariﬀ on imports, domestic prices are given by p1 = pw1, if good
1 is exported and p2 = pw2(1 + τ2), if good 2 is imported (which is what we assume as
the initial direction of trade).
The utility function for an individual who locates his/her labor in sector j we assume














where cji is consumption of good i (= 1,2) and nj is the number of people in sector j.
This formulation reﬂects the feature that individuals derive utility not only from
consumption of goods, but also from participation in the network in the region that
they choose to live in. An individual decides where to locate by comparing the utility
of locating , working and consuming in each of the two networks.
We assume, for simplicity, that the more people that are in the network the more
preferrend the outcome, but this may not be the case in practice if there are conﬂicts
between individuals or crowding/congestion eﬀects. λ is the share parameter on the two
consumption goods in the CES sub-utility function deﬁned over goods. ρ determines the
elasticity of substitution between the two goods. θ and µ are parameters which deter-
mine the strength of the network eﬀects. In the absence of prior literature, we assume
5parameters for this network sub-function for each sector. θj is the constant elasticity of
substitution share parameter between the network and traditional consumption beneﬁts.
µj is an exponent which implies that average and marginal network beneﬁts diﬀer. nj
is the number of members of the representative family (of size N) who locate in sector
j. For simplicity, we assume that the family is characterized by a single family.
The budget constraint individuals face if they choose to locate in sector j is
p1cj1 + p2cj2 = wjLj + Rj (2)
where p1 and p2 are domestic prices of goods 1 and 2 respectively, wj is the wage in
sector j, Lj is the amount of labor which locates in sector j, and Rj is the amount of
transfers these individuals receive both from the returns to the two ﬁxed factors and
tariﬀ revenues.
The two consumption goods (good 1 in the rural sector and good 2 in the urban
sector), are produced according to decreasing returns production functions which use







where Ai and αi are productivity and share parameters in the two sectors.
An equilibrium in this model can be characterized as follows:
1. Individual who locate in sector j given prices p1,p2,w1 and w2, and R, solve the















subject to: p1cj1 + p2cj2 = wj + R. (6)
2. Labor is paid its marginal value product in each sector.
3. Transfers, R, are given by the sum of the returns to the ﬁxed factors and tariﬀ
revenues. For simplicity these are assumed equally divided among the population.
4. A migration condition across the two locations, U1 = U2, is satisﬁed for all indi-
viduals.
In equilibrium, trade balance holds, i.e. pw1XM1 + pw2XM2 = 0, where XM1 and
XM2 are net imports (exports) of the two goods.
3 Numerical Computation of Equilibrium
Analytical comparative static analysis for this model is not feasible and so we use nu-
merical simulation analysis to compare equilibria under free trade and in the presence
of a tariﬀ. We numerically solve for model equilibria in the following way. N, pw1, pw2,
τ1 and τ2 are taken as exogenous. Given wj and R, we solve each individual’s maximiza-
tion problem assuming they locate in region j. First order conditions combined with the








































and goods markets clear
c11 + c21 = Y1 + XM1 (11)
c12 + c22 = Y2 + XM2, (12)
where XMi are net imports of the two goods. The labor market clears, that is
N = n1 + n2. (13)
and transfers, R, are the sum of the returns to the ﬁxed factors and tariﬀ revenue. We




((p1Y1 (1 − α1)) + (p2Y2 (1 − α2)) + τ1pw1XM1 + τ2pw2XM2). (14)
In equilibrium the migration condition implies
U1 = U2. (15)
8Trade balance holds as a property of an equilibrium, that is
pw1XM1 + pw2XM2 = 0. (16)
We use these conditions in a numerical optimization package (GAMS) and solve for both
tariﬀ and free trade equilibria and compare them. We are also able to reverse solve the
model in calibration mode using the same code.
4 Some Numerical Examples of Welfare Worsening
Trade Liberalization
For the model set out above we have constructed some examples of welfare worsening
trade liberalization using arbitrarily chosen model parameters. We use the parameter
values set out below in an experiment in which we eliminate a tariﬀ on imports and
compare free trade with tariﬀ equilibrium. We do this ﬁrst in the absence of network
eﬀects. These examples only serve to make our point that social considerations can
inﬂuence the desirability of free trade, since network beneﬁts in practice are diﬃcult to
quantify. We leave it for later work to reﬁne and apply our approach more concretely
to actual settings for particular economies.
9Using the following exogenous parameter values
Population of individuals in the representative family : N = 100
Number of labor units per person : L = 1
Number of families : 1
World prices : pw1 = 1,pw2 = 1.5
Utility parameters : ρ = 0.5,λ1 = λ2 = 0.5
Production shares : α1 = 0.8,α2 = 0.7
Productivity parameters : A1 = 1.3,A2 = 1
Tariﬀ rate: τ1 = 0,τ2 = 0.1.
The equilibrium solution for the model is that
n1 = 74.81, n2 = 25.19
U1 = U2 = 0.461,
and the remaining model solution values are
Demands : c11 = 0.357,c12 = 0.131,c21 = 0.357,c22 = 0.131
Output : Y1 = 41.03,Y2 = 9.57
Wages : w1 = 0.439,w2 = 0.439
and Net Trade : XM1 = −5.323,XM2 = 3.55.
If we eliminate the tariﬀ and compute a free trade equilibrium solution, the corresponding
10variables in equilibrium are
n1 = 80.72, n2 = 19.28
U1 = U2 = 0.463,
and
Demands : c11 = 0.333, c12 = 0.148, c21 = 0.333, c22 = 0.148
Output : Y1 = 43.60, Y2 = 7.94
Wages : w1 = 0.432, w2 = 0.432
and Net Trade : XM1 = −10.30, XM2 = 6.87.
In this case the demand for good 2 increases when the tariﬀ is eliminated, whereas
that for good 1 falls with the removal of the tariﬀ. Note that in the absence of network
eﬀects wages are equalized in the two sectors through migration. Since utility increases
for individuals in both sectors with the removal of tariﬀ on the urban good, trade
liberalization is unambiguously welfare improving in this case.
We next use the same set of parameter values for an experiment in which we eliminate
a tariﬀ on imports and again compare free trade with tariﬀ equilibrium, but now do this
in the presence of diﬀerential network eﬀects across urban and rural areas. We ﬁnd that
trade liberalization is welfare worsening in this case when network beneﬁts are taken
into account.
11We assume the following for the network parameters in the model parameterization
Network parameters:µ1 = 1.3,µ2 = 1.1,θ1 = θ2 = 0.5
In the tariﬀ case (τ1 = 0,τ2 = 0.1), the model solution is now
n1 = 20.03, n2 = 79.77
U1 = U2 = 6.538,
and the remaining model variables are
Demands : c11 = 0.430, c12 = 0.158, c21 = 0.267, c22 = 0.0.098
Output : Y1 = 14.30, Y2 = 21.48
Wages : w1 = 0.571, w2 = 0.31
and Net Trade : XM1 = 15.69, XM2 = −10.46
The higher wage in the rural sector oﬀsets the stronger network eﬀect in the urban sector
due to the substantially larger number of people who locate in the urban sector, even
though µ1 > µ2.
With free trade (τ1 = 0,τ2 = 0), the model solution is
n1 = 26.142, n2 = 73.588
U1 = U2 = 1.386.
12and the remaining model variables are
Demands : c11 = 0.40,c12 = 0.178,c21 = 0.25,c22 = 0.111
Output : Y1 = 17.84,Y2 = 20.27
Wages : w1 = 0.540,w2 = 0.289
Trade : XM1 = 11.103,XM2 = −7.402
Thus in the presence of diﬀerential network eﬀects for individuals trade liberalization
is in this case welfare worsening as there is a decrease in the utility of individuals
located in both sectors when the tariﬀ is removed on good 2. Hence diﬀerential network
eﬀects between rural and urban sectors imply that trade liberalization can be welfare
worsening when social considerations are take into account. If the above set of non
network parameter values is used with the same network eﬀects in both the sectors,
trade liberalization is again beneﬁcial.
In these computations we only compare equilibrium in the presence of an arbitrary
tariﬀ to one under free trade. Given diﬀerntial urban rural network eﬀects, an optimal
tariﬀ can be computed, although we have not done that here. Free trade can thus
dominate an arbitrary tariﬀ since the tariﬀ chosen may greatly exceed the optimal tariﬀ.
135 Conclusion
In the paper we use numerical simulation to show that when social considerations are
taken into account the conventional argument that trade liberalization is welfare improv-
ing for a small open price taking economy need not apply. This reﬂects the presence of
social networks in urban and rural areas that individuals may choose to join. Network
beneﬁts create uninternalized externalities, whose diﬀerential externality beneﬁts can be
captured through a tariﬀ.
While simplistic, we believe our analysis is relevant to the wider debate on the social
consequences of globalization, where social factors strongly enter verbal discussion of the
desirability of free trade but are absent from the analytics of economists. More complex
formulations with positive and negative network eﬀects are possible, and we leave these
for later elaboration. Empirical implementation of our structure may be diﬃcult, but
this does not detract from our main point.
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